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On 10 August 2014, Turkey will hold the first round of presidential election which are 
of specific importance, as its results will shape the country’s both domestic politics and external 
relations. This paper discusses the key challenges which Turkey’s next president must 
undertake. The domestic challenges range from revision of Constitution, Kurdish peace process 
and economic growth to polarization of society, freedom of judiciary, separation of powers and 
civil liberties. In the external relations area, the principal challenges are the worsening of 
country’s relations with its neighbours, security threats and the stalemate of the EU integration. 
Several domestic and external challenges are inter-related: for instance, the freedom of 
judiciary, separation of powers and civil liberties affect the EU integration process; the 
political uncertainty relates to economic growth and foreign investments; the Kurdish peace 
process impacts on the external security issues; the economic factors influence the relations 
with the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraq’s central government; the Syrian crisis 
raises new challenges with regard to the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Therefore, addressing 
Turkey’s current domestic and external challenges will be a long, puzzling and often 
conflicting-results process.  
 
First direct presidential election in an agitated complex domestic political context 
This election has a significant political importance, as it is the first time when the 
president is elected by popular vote since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923; 
previously, the president was elected by the members of the parliament - Turkish Grand 
National Assembly. The first round of presidential election will take place on 10 August 2014 
and if a candidate will receive more than 50 percent of all ballots cast, that candidate will be 
elected president. If no candidate manages to be elected by simple majority, then the two 
candidates obtaining the most votes will compete in the second round of election on 24 August.  
There are three major political competitors who bid Turkey’s presidency: Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu and Selahattin Demirtaş. Turkey’s current Prime Minister 
                                                          
1 Note: This paper represents the views of the authors, not the position of the Center for International Relations 
Studies (CEFIR). Madalina Sisu Vicari is PhD student at the Center for International Relations Studies (CEFIR), 
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Recep Tayyip Erdogan2 is the candidate and the chairman of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP)3, political party which has been continuously dominating Turkey’s 
political scene since 20024. His main rival, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, is an academic and former 
Secretary General of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and he is jointly supported by 
the main Turkish opposition parties - the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP) - but also by other seven smaller parties: the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), the Independent Turkey Party (BTP), the Democratic Party (DP), the Democratic Left 
Party (DSP) and the Great Union Party (BBP). The CHP’s and MHP’s common support for 
Ihsanoglu, who has a undisputed Islamic background and rather a conservative profile, is seen 
as an attempt of CHP and MHP of targeting the Islamic and/or conservative electorate, who 
traditionally voted, in the past 12 years, with AKP. On the other hand, some of CHP’s ultra-
secular supporters questioned the choice of Ihsanoglu, perceived as being too religious. 
Consequently, in his first interview after being nominated, Ihsanoglu addressed the secular 
voters, speaking about the importance of the founder of the modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, whom he sees as a hero of the fight for independence5. The third candidate Selahattin 
Demirtaş is the co-chair of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). Though 
claiming the Kurds’ right to have education in own language and their more inclusive 
participation in the public administration, Demirtaş has been seeking to target more than the 
traditional Kurdish electoral base.  
According to the poll results6, the current Prime Minister still has the first chance to win 
the presidential elections and thus to become the 12th president of Turkey. Nevertheless, 
Ihsanoglu’s bid for presidency together with the measures taken by Erdogan against the 
Gülenists7 might alienate a part of his traditional electorate. If Erdogan will not win the election 
in the first round, three elements will be critical in determining the winner of presidential 
                                                          
2 Erdogan serves the third consecutive term as Prime Minister which makes him one of Turkey’s longest serving 
Prime Ministers; the record for the longest term in office as Prime Minister belongs to Mustafa Ismet İnönü who 
served for 16 years.  
3 Since November 2002, AKP won six consecutive elections : three general elections (2002-35 % of votes ; 2007-
47 % of votes ; 2011-50 % of votes) and four local elections (2004-42 % of votes ; 2009-38 % of votes ; 2014-
45 % of votes).  
4 “No party in Turkey’s legislative history has achieved electoral results even close to those of AKP” which made 
the party to become a “hegemonic governing force”: KEYMAN E. Fuat, “The AKP Party: Dominant Party, New 
Turkey and Polarization”, Insight Turkey, Vol.16, N° 2, 2014, p. 23. 
5 HURRIYET DAILY NEWS, “Main opposition parties’ presidential candidate responds to criticism”, June 18, 
2014. 
6 A part of Turkish media, which more or less supports the current Prime Minister, has presented polls which show 
that Erdogan is going to win more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round. Other polls, presented by more 
independent media, show that Erdogan is most likely to win nearly 42 percent of the votes in the first round, which 
will lead to a second round of presidential election.  
7 See below. 
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election: CHP’s and MHP’s capacity to convince their electorate to vote for Ihsanoglu, 
Ihsanoglu’s ability to gather votes from AKP’s electorate and the percentage of the Kurdish 
voters who will vote for Erdogan8. A fourth element might be also important in determining the 
winner in the situation of a second round - the votes of the second largest religious minority in 
Turkey after Sunni, namely the Alevis9, especially that, according to the polls, their votes will 
be split between the three candidates.  
However, from 2015 onwards, the Prime Minister position would not have been 
available for Erdogan, as the article 132 of the AKP’s charter bans the party’s members from 
occupying the same elected position more than three terms10. Consequently, in order to maintain 
his influence on Turkish political landscape, Erdogan had had no other option but to run for 
presidency.  
According to the article 101 of the Turkish Constitution, the President of Turkey cannot 
be member of a political party: therefore, if elected president of the Republic, Erdogan shall 
give up his AKP’s membership. However, it is very likely that Erdogan will wish to continue 
to exerting his influence on AKP and therefore he will attempt to designate a loyal successor to 
take the helm of the party. But this move will not suffice for Erdogan to keep a strong hand on 
AKP, nor will it help him to maintain a wide and powerful influence on Turkish political scene. 
Consequently, if he wish to remain an important factor in Turkey’s political life - and he did 
not show any sign that he intends to be relegated to a second role - Erdogan has no option but 
to change the Constitution.  
On the other hand, the presidential election is held after a very agitated and politically 
troubled period shaped by the Gezi massive anti-government protests11, the graft scandal 12 and 
                                                          
8 DOGAN Poyraz Donca, “Sencar: Undecided voters key to determining Turkey’s new president”, Today’s Zaman, 
July 13, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/monday-talk_sencar-undecided-voters-key-to-determining-turkeys-
new-president_352907.html, (consulted on August 8, 2014). 
9  The number of Alevis in Turkey is difficult to be estimated precisely due to the lack of accurate information and 
to the fact that many Alevis opt out not to declare their identity; some estimations figure their number between 7-
13 million, though other estimations figure much higher numbers, which range between 15-20 million.  
10 CAGAPTAY Soner, JEFFREY F. James, “Turkey’s 2014 Political Transition. From Erdogan to Erdogan?”, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes, N° 17, January 2014, pp. 1-14. 
11 The “Gezi protests” started on 28 May 2013 as a movement of resistance against the demolition of one of the 
few green-areas of Istanbul, the Gezi Park from Taksim Square. The protests transformed into a wave of civil 
unrests which spread mainly in Istanbul but also across Turkey. The government claimed a conspiracy behind the 
protests; the police intervention against the demonstrations was a brutal one and consequently the Turkish 
authorities were widely criticized at international level for their response to the protests.  
12 Turkish government was rattled in December 2013 by an immense corruption scandal which involved the sons 
of Ministers of the Interior, Economy, Environment and Urban Planning. The Minister of European Affairs and 
Chief Negotiator together with Erdogan’s two sons were cited as potential suspects in this case, which involved 
corruption, bribery, money laundering and fraud. On 17 December 2013, 47 people have been detained as part of 
the investigation, including businesspeople, bureaucrats and the aforementioned three ministers’ sons; they were 
accused of accepting and facilitating bribes for major urbanization projects, manipulating state tenders, export 
fraud, forgery of documents, abuse of power and more. A second probe was launched by the public prosecutors 
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the government’s measures following the scandal. Erdogan claimed that behind the graft 
scandal was a conspiracy involving national and international elements led by Gülen 
Movement13, which set up a “parallel state” and plotted to overthrow the government.  
In reaction to the graft scandal, the government undertook a wide purge of police 
officers: consequently, 350 officers in Ankara were dismissed or assigned overnight to new 
roles, 402 officers in the Istanbul financial crimes unit were reassigned and around 15 000 
officers have been allegedly assigned, suspended or dismissed throughout the country14. The 
purges against the police staff continued months later: on 22 July 2014, 115 officers, including 
former senior police chiefs, were detained, being accused of spying and illegal wiretapping of 
politicians and bureaucrats (including Prime Minister Erdogan and the chief of National 
Intelligence Organization). In the hunt of the “parallel state”, 31 police officers have been sent 
to prison so far, including the former Istanbul’s police intelligence chief.  
Government’s action targeted also independence of judiciary, separation of powers, 
civil liberties and freedom of expression. In January 2014, the Supreme Board of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSYK) removed 96 judges and prosecutors from their posts; this move was 
followed by a package of measures proposed by government and voted by parliament 
modifying the status of HYSK, which granted the Minister of Justice increased authority over 
the appointments of judges and prosecutors in a manner attacking the separation of powers. The 
Constitutional Court overturn, on 11 April 2014, the provision of the law which gave the 
government control over the judiciary and following this decision, Erdogan criticized the 
Court’s president.  
In February 2014, the Turkish parliament adopted amendments to law 5651 on the 
“Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes Committed by means of 
Such Publication” allowing authorities to block websites for a privacy violation without seeking 
permission from a court and collect web users’ data for two years. A month later, the 
                                                          
on 23 December 2013, when was ordered the arrest of tens of people (the number varies, function of sources) on 
similar charges; nonetheless, these arrests have not been carried out. On 25 December 2013, Erdogan undertook a 
sweeping government’s reshuffle, replacing 10 members of his Cabinet. A day after, on 26 December 2013, the 
prosecutor investigating the scandal, Muammer Akkaş, has been removed from the case.  
13 The Gülen Movement, lead by Fetullah Gülen, a religious leader who lives in voluntary exile in Pennsylvania 
now, emerged as a religious movement towards the end of 1970s, but since late ‘80s it focused on educational 
activities, promoting higher education. It “encouraged students to pursue careers in law enforcement, the military 
and the judiciary in order to form a ‘parallel state’ ” and despite the fact that it is a religious group, it “did not 
hesitate to distance itself from Islamist movements”: OZHAN Taha, “The Longest Year of Turkish Politics: 2014”, 
Insight Turkey, Volume 14, N° 1, 2012, p. 86. 
14 SEZER Seda, “Police purge undermines Turkish security operations, sacked officers say”, Reuters, July 3, 2014, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/03/us-turkey-security-insight-idUKKBN0F812620140703, (consulted on 
August 8, 2014). 
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government attempted to restrain the freedom of expression by banning Twitter15 and YouTube; 
previously, the Prime Minister had blamed the two social media channels for fuelling anti-
government rhetoric. Nonetheless, the government continued its offensive against civil liberties 
and on 17 April 2014 the government passed a bill which substantially increased the powers of 
National Intelligence Agency by giving it the access to information collected by public and 
private institutions without a court order.  
The government continued its offensive against judiciary beyond the measures targeting 
HYSK. On 28 June 2014, it passed judicial package which restructures the Supreme Court of 
Appeals and gives to a few “super penal judges” the unilateral power to initiate and finalize an 
investigation and to issue orders as detention, arrest, searches and freezing of assets. Under the 
same package, no appeals whatsoever are allowed to a higher court, any appeal going to a “super 
penal” judge16. 
In this tense and highly polarized political context, the future president will face many 
and complicated domestic challenges. But the external challenges are not either less numerous 
or less difficult, mostly because addressing them successfully will imply the restart of Turkey’s 
foreign policy.  
 
Domestic challenges: Constitution’s revision, Kurdish peace process, economic growth, 
polarization of society, freedom of judiciary, civil liberties 
As it was mentioned above, in case that Turkey’s next president will become the current 
Prime Minister, one of his main priorities will be to change the Constitution17, most probably 
by shifting to a presidential or semi-presidential system from the current parliamentary one. In 
light of the past events, it is also very likely that Erdogan will push as well for some 
constitutional changes allowing the government to have a greater control on the judiciary.  
The process of Constitution’s revision requires either 367 or 330 (in the latter situation the 
revision must be followed by a referendum) out of the 550 National Assembly’s votes. AKP 
holds 313 parliamentary seats; therefore the change of Constitution cannot be carried out during 
this legislative term without the support of HDP, which holds 27 seats18. Though, HDP’s 
support would not come in the absence of a heavy bargain for constitutional changes including 
                                                          
15 Twitter was banned on 20 March 2014 whereas YouTube was banned on 27 March 2014. The ban on Twitter 
was removed on 3 April 2014 and the ban on YouTube on 3 June 2014, following the rules of Constitutional Court 
which decided that the bans were unconstitutional and violated the freedom of speech. 
16 TODAY’S ZAMAN, “Timeline: July 22 police detentions in Turkey”, August 1, 2014.  
17 Erdogan stated, in the speech presented his “presidential vision”, that a new Constitution will be a priority for 
his mandate.  
18 The rest of parliamentary seats are shared between CHP (135 seats) and MHP (52 seats).  
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inter alia, a greater participation of Kurds in public administration and guaranteeing the right 
to have education in own language. If accepted, such requests might raise opposition’s criticism, 
which can claim that granting concessions to Kurds would jeopardize the fundamentals of 
Turkish national state and might use the issue in the electoral campaign of future legislative 
election. Erdogan will wait for 2015 - the year of future legislative election - to undertake 
constitutional changes only if the opposition will be divided, weak and unable to turn itself into 
a real alternative to the current “hegemonic governing force”.  
 
 
Erdogan uses 3D hologram to address AKP’s members. Credit: Hurriyet Daily News 
 
If Ihsanoglu become president, it is very unlikely that CHP and MHP would be pleased 
with a political regime’s change, but CHP might push for a more civilian Constitution. And that 
not only because its leader, Kemal Kilidarcoglu, claimed for a change focused on freedom’s 
and democracy’s values within Constitution Reconciliation Commission’s work, but also to 
further rally more supporters, especially from the flank of those who claim that Erdogan takes 
measures targeting Turkey’s democracy and rules the country in a growing authoritarian way. 
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As “economic growth in Turkey is one of the most important issues affecting the 
decisions of the voters”19, economy plays important role in shaping voters’ preferences. Over 
the last decade, Turkey experienced remarkable growth and development, becoming an “upper-
middle-income country with a population of 75 million and with a GDP of US $786 billion, 
making it the 18th largest economy in the world”20. The Turkish economy transformed 
spectacularly, especially when compared with the late 1990s, when “Turkey was running 90 % 
inflation and attracting almost no foreign investment”21 and 2002, when “Turkey was using up 
almost 90 % of its tax revenues to pay the interest on its debt”22. The GDP growth had 
impressive rates: it averaged nearly 7 % during 2003-2007, 9 % in 2010 and 9.6 % in the first 
three quarters of 201123. 
Though not gloomy, Turkey’s growth prospects do not show that the country will 
perform economically as successful as in the previous years: inflation reached in May 2014 a 
two year high of 9.66 %, the current account deficit is above 7 % of GDP, the Turkish corporate, 
banking and government sectors face the repayment of approximately US $163 billion in 
external liabilities, the household debt rocketed due to easy credit. Moreover, political 
uncertainty has been eroded investors’ confidence. To contain the Turkish lira losses, the 
Central Bank had raised Turkey’s benchmark interest rates by 550 basis points in January 2014, 
a measure heavily criticized by Prime Minister Erdogan. In July 2014, ahead of few weeks of 
presidential election, the Central Bank - formally independent - cut the interest rates for a third 
consecutive month, though the current Prime Minister asked for deeper cuts. Since the U.S. 
Federal Reserve announced a planned reduction of extraordinary monetary stimulus in May 
2013 - which reduces both FDIs and short-term financial flows - the Turkish lira lost around 
29 % of its value against the U.S. dollar24.  
Analysts and international institutions have been warning over some problematic issues 
of Turkey’s economy. IMF slashed Turkey’s growth for 2014 from 3.5 % to 2.3 % whereas 
                                                          
19 ERDOGAN Emre, “Erdogan’s Longest Year”, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Analysis, 
October 3, 2013, p. 1. 
20 THE WORLD BANK, “World Bank Group -Turkey Partnership: Country Program Snapshot”, The World Bank, 
April 2014, p. 2. 
21 DOMBEY Daniel, “Six Markets to Watch: Turkey. How Erdogan Did It -- and Could Blow It”, Foreign Affairs, 
January/February 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140338/ daniel-dombey/six-markets-to-watch-
turkey, (consulted on 8 August 2014). 
22 Ibid. 
23 THE WORLD BANK, “World Bank Group Continues Strong Partnership with Turkey: 2012 - 2015 Country 
Partnership Strategy Launched”, Washington, March 27, 2012, p. 3, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23154320~menuPK:51062075~pageP
K:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html, (consulted on August 8, 2014). 
24 THE WORLD BANK, “World Bank Group -Turkey Partnership: Country Program Snapshot”, op. cit., p. 2. 
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OECD raised its growth forecast for 2014 to 3.3 % from its previous forecast of 2.8 %. The 
World Bank recommended the establishing of an economic growth model less dependent on 
debt-financed consumption and higher domestic savings combined with more fiscal prudence25 
and the IMF foreseen that “without structural reform, higher interest rates, and tighter spending 
policies, the country would be left with an unenviable choice between sluggish growth and 
bouts of instability”26.  
 
 
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu (center).  Credit: Anadolu Ajansi. 
 
The Kurdish issue is another main challenge ahead of the future president and that not 
only because it have been for long time one of the most thorny problems of Turkish society, but 
also due to the fact that the Kurds represent between 15-20 % out of the total Turkey’s 
population, approximately 15 million. In 2012, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s National 
Intelligence Organization (MIT) started talks with Abdullah Ocalan27 in order to convince PKK 
                                                          
25 THE WORLD BANK, “Turkey Public Finance Review Turkey in Transition: Time for a Fiscal Policy Pivot?”, 
Document of the World Bank, Report No. 85104-TR, May 20, 2014, pp. 1-68. 
26 DOMBEY Daniel, “Six Markets to Watch: Turkey. How Erdogan Did It -- and Could Blow It”, op. cit. 
27 Abdullah Ocalan is one of the founding members of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Arrested in 1999, he was 
condemned to death, but his sentence was commuted in 2002 to life imprisonment.  
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(The Kurdistan Workers’ Party) to give up its arms and withdraw from the Turkish soil28. These 
negotiations were supported not only by political parties as CHP and the pro-Kurdish Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP) but also by civil society’s and media organizations29. After 30 years 
of conflict, Abdullah Ocalan made a historic gesture in March 2013 and declared ceasefire with 
Turkey. In May 2013, the Kurdish rebels started to withdraw from Turkey to Northern Iraq; 
they stopped the withdrawal at the beginning of September 2013 - for governments’ failure to 
take steps in peace process - but they maintained the ceasefire. The government’s reaction was 
the unveiling, on 30 September 2013, of the “Democratization Package”30. Moreover, on 26 
June 2014, the Turkish government submitted to the Parliament a reform bill which sets out the 
framework for achieving the peace talks, "The Bill to End Terrorism and Strengthen Social 
Solidarity"31, which was subsequently already approved by the president Abdullah Gul32. 
Negotiating the Kurdish peace process may be a risky strategy - as it might antagonize the 
nationalist electorate - but it may bring economic benefits by stopping further pipeline attacks33 
and protecting the energy agreements concluded between the Turkish government and the 
Kurdistan Regional Government. It may also have important foreign policy and security 
consequences, as achieving peace with the Turkish Kurds could help Turkey to contain a further 
spilling over of instability in the North-eastern part of Syria, controlled by the PKK - affiliated 
Democratic Union Party. 
Other important challenge the future president will face, either he will be Erdogan or 
Ihsanoglu, is the exacerbation of political and social polarization of Turkish society, whose 
public manifestation started with 2013 Gezi Movement and continued in 2014 with several 
contestation movements against the current Prime Minister. Though polarization has helped 
                                                          
28 TASPINAR Ömer, TOL Gönül, “Turkey and the Kurds: from Predicament to Opportunity”, US-Europe Analysis 
Series, Centre on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution, N° 54, January 22, 2014, p. 4. 
29 Ibid. 
30 This Package allows Kurdish language education though only in private schools, lift the ban of Kurdish 
language’s use in electoral campaigns, remove the practice of the oath recited by schoolchildren every morning: 
“I am a Turk”, allows Kurdish towns to use their Kurdish names and reinstates the legal use of letters such as Q, 
W, and X - which are not used in Turkish language. TASPINAR Ömer, TOL Gönül, “Turkey and the Kurds: from 
Predicament to Opportunity”, op. cit., p. 5. 
31 The six article bill puts the peace process under legal and institutional protection by encouraging to making 
contacts, establishing dialogue with “individuals, institutions and organizations both inside and outside the 
country”; it encourages the militants of the outlawed PKK to drop their weapons and facilitates their integration 
into Turkey’s social life and ensures legal immunity for all those involved in the peace talks, too.  
32 Many political commentators put “The Bill to End Terrorism and Strengthen Social Solidarity" in direct relation 
with the current Prime Minister’s need to win the votes of Kurdish electorate, which represents nearly one fifth of 
Turkey’s population. In case Erdogan will not win the presidential election in the first round, the Kurdish votes 
may provide an overwhelming percentage of the swing vote in the second round of election. 
33 The PKK militants have been attacking the pipelines crossing the Turkish territory as a way to sabotage Turkey’s 
economy and its strategic assets. For instance, the attack perpetrated in May 2012 on the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum 
pipeline cut off nearly 15 % of Turkey’s daily gas consumption.  
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Erdogan to enhance his constituency and win elections so far, it has been coming with the price 
of strengthening fragmentation, even division34. In all probability, if Erdogan wins the 
presidential election and goes toward the settling of a strong presidential regime, the 
contestation movements will not stop, the polarization will not fade away; on the contrary, 
contestation and polarization altogether will heavily increase, especially if the actions targeting 
civil liberties, freedom of judiciary and separation of powers will continue. And it is equally 
likely that putting the blame on Gülenists’ plots or foreign conspiracies will not be beneficial 
either for the future president or for the Turkish society as a whole. 
 
Foreign policy challenges: from “zero problems with the neighbours” to “no neighbors 
without problems”, security threats, stalemate of the EU integration 
Since AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey did not hesitate to carry out a sustained and 
robust diversification of its external relations in order to play a greater role on the international 
political scene. In this regard, Ankara launched a global and ambitious strategy of "zero 
problems with the neighbours”35 which led to a fundamental change in its foreign policy: it 
shifted from a traditional and almost unilateral Western focus to a greater political and 
economic implication with its Southern and Eastern neighbours. The main goal of this strategy 
was that of pulling Turkey out from the unilateral Western-oriented foreign policy of the Cold 
War and ultimately of imposing Turkey as a regional power in a "globalized world"36.  
From the very beginning, the aforementioned shift aimed at making Turkey’s foreign 
policy a multidimensional and pro-active one and in this regard Turkey attempted at 
fostering - mainly in its neighbouring area - diplomatic, economic, trade, cultural and even 
religious ties. Moreover, Turkey initiated new dialogues with Iran, Iraq, the Kurds in Northern 
Iraq and Syria.  
                                                          
34 KEYMAN E. Fuat, “The AKP Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polarization”, op. cit., p. 29. 
35 The “zero problems with the neighbours” strategy derives from the « Strategic Depth » doctrine initiated by 
Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu who was appointed in 2002 chief foreign policy advisor and received 
a sort of free hand to shape the Turkish foreign policy. His academic work, the "Strategic Depth”, published in 
2001, argues  that Turkey should benefit of its two fixed assets, which are also great and unique - the geopolitical 
location and the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire - which can make Turkey a regional power in its own 
right. The “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors” is one of the several principles of “Strategic Depth” 
doctrine. DAVUTOGLU Ahmet, « Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy », Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?pa ge=0,2, (consulted 
on June 29, 2014). Davutoglu states that, in this new picture, Turkey  must take up its role of “providing security 
and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighbors and the region” : DAVUTOGLU Ahmet, “Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment for 2007”, Insight Turkey, Volume 1, N° 1, 2008, pp.77-96. 
36 BILLION Didier, « Réflexions introductives sur la politique extérieure de la Turquie », in Turquie : le 
déploiement stratégique, sous la direction de Firouzeh NAHAVANDI, Bruxelles, Groupe De Boeck s. a., Éditions 
Bruylant, 2012, pp. 48-49. 
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Despite its initial success, the Arab Spring, the war in Syria and the recent crisis in Iraq  
have been strongly challenging Turkey’s foreign policy and showed not only its limits, but 
questioned  the approach under it has been carried out, too. After 2011, Turkey’s “soft power” 
was perceived as shifting towards an aggressive power, attempting to coerce and forcefully 
align its neighbours’ policies37. A mix of miscalculations of foreign policy’s capacities and 
capabilities, together with wrong decisions related to Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Israel led to an 
imprisonment of Turkey’s foreign policy within the Middle East turmoil. Therefore, a dramatic 
reversal in Turkish foreign policy took place and former “Turkey’s ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’ policy was gradually replaced by a policy of ‘no neighbors without problems’’’38. 
The next Turkish president, either Erdogan or Ihsanoglu, will have to face very complicated, 
troublesome foreign policy’s challenges, particularly with regard to Syria and Iraq along with 
the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with Israel, respectively Egypt. 
First neighbour with which Turkey strained its relations was Israel. In February 2006, 
Khaled Mashaal, the leader of Hamas, paid a surprising visit to Ankara, though Erdogan did 
not meet him personally. This political gesture was both a clear signal of Turkey’s position with 
regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and an anticipation of further Ankara’s engagement 
with an organization considered by many in the Western world as a terrorist one. In January 
2009, Erdogan clashed with Israeli president at Davos Forum and left the stage. In May 2010, 
an Israeli commando boarded the Mavi Marmara ship, part of a six ships-flotilla, which 
intended to break the Gaza blockade by delivering humanitarian supplies. The clashes broke 
during the Israeli assault and 9 Turkish citizens died. Following the incident, the relations 
between Turkey and Israel downgraded to an unprecedented level as Turkey withdrew its 
ambassador from Tel Aviv, cancelled joint military exercises and Erdogan displayed a strong 
anti-Israel rhetoric. In October 2012, the leader of Hamas was invited at AKP’s Fourth Congress 
where he received standing ovations. Turkey and Israel restored their diplomatic relations in 
March 2013, due to US President Barack Obama involvement in the reconciliation. The Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized to the Turkish people and he agreed with the 
Turkish side on compensation to the victims’ families. But the relations between the two 
countries have been heavily deteriorated since the beginning of the Israeli-Hamas conflict 
which started on 8 July 2014, followed by Israel’s ground offensive in Gaza on 18 July 2014. 
                                                          
37 RETHINK INSTITUTE WASHINGTON DC, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Challenges”, Rethink Conference, 
November 4, 2013, p. 15. 
38 CANDAR Cengiz, “Turkey’s foreign policy reset will not be easy”, Al-Monitor, December 1, 2013, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/turkeys-foreign-policy-reset-not-easy.html, (consulted on 
August 8, 2014). 
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Turkey’s Prime Minister displayed a tough anti-Israel rhetoric again, accusing Israel of seeking 
systematic genocide against the Palestinians.  
 Egypt is another neighbor with which Turkey has difficult relations. A staunch 
supporter of the former president Mohammed Morsi39, Erdogan called his removal an 
“unacceptable coup” and his party, AKP, announced that the “coup regime in Egypt” will not 
be recognized, as Morsi is the “legitimate president”40. Turkish Prime Minister compared the 
Egyptian ex-army chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi41 to Bashar al-Assad, saying that “there is no 
difference between them” and accused Egypt of committing “state terrorism”42. He even 
involved Israel into the dispute, “saying that Israel was ‘behind’ the coup in Cairo”43.  
In response to Erdogan’s and AKP’s declarations, Turkey and Egypt mutually expelled 
their ambassadors in August 2013. The Turkish ambassador returned to Cairo several weeks 
later, but Egypt expelled him in November 2013, declaring him “persona non grata” and scaling 
back its diplomatic relations with Turkey to the level of chargé d’affaires. Egypt called 
Ankara’s interference in Egyptian affairs, accusing Turkey of backing organizations which 
spread instability, a direct reference to Turkey’s support for Muslim Brotherhood. But Turkey’s 
criticism of al-Sisi has been putting Ankara at odds with Saudi Arabia, too, as Riyadh offered 
political, financial and oil support to Egyptian military and now it is aiming providing consistent 
economic support to Egypt’s struggling economy. Egypt’s diplomatic efforts to seek a mediator 
role between Israel and Hamas ignited a new rift between Ankara and Cairo as in July 2014 
Erdogan repeatedly called al-Sisi a “tyrant”; Egypt responded to Erdogan’s new war of words 
by summoning twice in a month the Turkish chargé d’affaires in Cairo. 
By late 1990, Turkey and Syria had very strained relations, partly due of Cold War 
legacy, partly because Syria had helped and supported PKK, whose leader, Abdullah Öcalan, 
                                                          
39 Mohammed Morsi was the first Egypt’s civilian president; he came to power in June 2012 as the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s candidate. He faced opposition protests over several months, culminating with a massive unrest on 
30 June 2013.  On 3 July 2013, following massive anti-Morsi demonstrations, the army suspended the Constitution 
and announced the formation of a technocratic government. Overthrown by the military, Morsi was arrested, being 
charged of conspiring with Hamas to destabilize Egypt. 
40 TODAY’S ZAMAN, “From honeymoon to bitter divorce: Turkey-Egypt relations in 2013”, December 25, 2013, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-334933-from-honeymoon-to-bitter-divorce-turkey-egypt-relations-in-
2013.html (consulted on August 8, 2014). 
41 A former head of Egypt’s armed forces, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi won the presidential election conducted in May 
2013 and took office as the sixth Egypt’s president on 8 June 2013.  
42 HURRIYET DAILY NEWS, “Egypt committing state terrorism, al-Sisi and al-Assad are same: Turkish PM”, 
August 17, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/egypt-committing-state-terrorism-al-sisi-and-al-assad-are-
same-turkish-pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=52723&NewsCatID=338, (consulted on 8 August 2014). 
43 ZALEWSKI Piotr, “How Turkey Went from ‘Zero Problems’ to Zero Friends. And lost its leverage 
everywhere”, Foreign Policy, August 22, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/20/foggy_botto 




lived in Damascus until 1998. Öcalan’s expelling from Syria and his further capture by Turkish 
authorities opened the door for relations’ normalization between the two countries. Ankara’s 
rapprochement to Damascus was strengthened by AKP’s rise to power in 2003; thereafter, the 
governments of Turkey and Syria started to develop consistent political and economic bilateral 
relations. In 2007, a Free Trade Agreement entered into force, followed, in September 2009, by 
the setting up of the Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council which met several 
times at ministerial and prime ministerial levels. The bilateral trade bolstered, followed by the 
increase of investment level and the tourism, facilitated by the lift of visa requirements in 2009. 
The future of Turkey-Syria relations seemed very rosy; thus, the Turkish media’s headlines said 
that Turkey and Syria are “the best friends” and Erdogan called Assad “a good friend of mine”. 
But the very friendly political landscape abruptly changed in the spring of 2011, when protests 
broke out in Syria against Assad’s regime. A few weeks earlier, in February 2011, Erdogan had 
asked Egypt’s ex-president Mubarak to step down as the latter was facing massive protest 
movements. Erdogan’s call for Mubarak’s resignation was driven by the political calculations 
that a popular, Islamic movement taking power in Egypt will help enhancing Turkey’s role as 
regional leader. Seeing in Syrian protests against Assad another window of opportunity for 
Turkey’s “soft power” projection, Erdogan asked his “friend” Bashar al-Assad to carry out 
democratic reforms. Assad turned down the demand regarding the implementation of 
democratic reforms; moreover, when the government started to curb the protests, he dismissed 
Ankara’s calls of refraining from using violence against civilians. So Turkey turned against its 
old “friend” and started to provide support to the Sunni - dominated Syrian National Council 
(SNC)44 and the Free Syrian Army (FSA)45 while launching a diplomatic coalition which was 
aimed at toppling the Syrian president. Meanwhile, Turkey has been keeping a positively 
neutral position towards the armed jihadists joining the rebellion against Assad. Though Ankara 
did not officially support the jihadists, it seems that the Turkish government turned a blind eye 
toward the flows of jihadists which used Turkey as their main entry point to Syria. The rising 
of the ISIL changed this situation, as it has already been changing Turkey’s approach toward 
the PKK - affiliated Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) which, with the tacit approval of 
                                                          
44 Set up in Istanbul in September 2011 and backed by Turkey and Qatar, SNC is a coalition of organizations and 
individuals which includes, among others, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and various Kurdish organizations. 
Following US announcement that they do not consider SNC as the leading organization of Syrian opposition, SNC 
joined The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (National Coalition) in November 
2012. The National Coalition is recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people by nearly 100 
countries, including US, France, UK and Turkey.  




Assad regime, took control of large parts of North-eastern Syria. Turkey’s rhetoric towards 
PYD softened, as now ISIL actions represent a bigger threat to Turkey. At the same time, an 
increasing autonomy of Syrian Kurdish region may intensify the Kurdish nationalism in Turkey 
and offer PKK a large room of manoeuvre and an upper hand in the negotiations with Turkish 
authorities. In this context, achieving the peace process with Turkey’s Kurds is crucial for 
country’s security.  
The issue of Syrian refuges is another critical issue for Turkey. Since April 2011, an 
increasing flow of Syrian refugees crossed the border into Turkey, which maintains an open- 
border policy. There are nearly 22 camps along the border with Syria which host nearly 
220 000 refugees and there are hundreds of thousands of refugees in the cities. In June 2014, 
the Turkish authorities announced that the overall number of Syrian refuges in Turkey exceeded 
1 million persons and by the end of the year is expected to reach 1.5 million. Providing 
humanitarian assistance and addressing the increasingly growing refugees’ needs of shelter, 
health, schooling and jobs is a serious, long-term challenge for Turkey.  
Syria’s conflict mounted the diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Iran, a key ally 
and unconditional supporter of Assad’s regime, but also, though indirectly, between Turkey 
and Iraq. A consequence of Turkey’s increased support of Sunni groups was that it offered 
refuge in April 2012 to Iraq’s Sunni deputy president Tariq al-Hashem, charged by Shia Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki for running death squads. Turkey refused to extradite al-Hashemi; 
soon after this incident the leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Masoud 
Barzani arrives in Ankara and so a trade of words started between Turkish and Iraqi Prime 
Ministers. Erdogan accused al-Maliki of stimulating sectarianism between the Iraq’s Sunni, 
Shia and Kurds; in response, al-Maliki accused Erdogan of attempting to interfere in Iraq’s 
affairs and declared Turkey a “hostile” state with a sectarian agenda. But the worsening of 
relations between Ankara and Bagdad had been fuelled by the continuous economically 
motivated rapprochement of Turkey to KRG. Since 2008 the diplomatic and economic ties 
between Turkey and KRG have been enhancing but the energy partnership remains the core of 
cooperation between Ankara and Erbil, motivated by Turkey’s energy needs. Over the last 20 
years, Turkey’s energy consumption more than doubled and the country is “heavily dependent 
on external hydrocarbon supplies”46, mostly imported from Russia and Iran. Moreover, 
                                                          
46 KORANYI David, SARTORI Nicolo, “EU-Turkish Energy Relations in the Context of EU Negotiations: Focus 
on Natural Gas”, Atlantic Council Dinu Patriciu and Istituto Afari Internazionali (IAI), Working Paper, N° 5, 
December 2013, p. 3. 
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Turkey’s energy use will continue to grow at an annual rate of nearly 4.5 % in 2015-203047.  In 
2012, energy accounted for a quarter of Turkey’s $237 billion spent on imports and, according 
to IMF, Turkey’s annual energy import costs will exceed $70 billion by 201748. Therefore, in 
order to ensure a further, sustainable economic growth, Turkey needs not only to meet its 
domestic energy demand, but to ensure hydrocarbon supplies at a price which will not heavily 
burden the energy bill. This was the main rationale of collaboration in the energy area between 
Ankara and Erbil - which includes service contracts and production sharing -, a collaboration 
recently enhanced by the sign of a 50 year deal to export Kurdish oil to Turkey.  
Energy cooperation between Ankara and Erbil was another element which put a strain 
on the Turkish-Iraqi relations ; according to the Iraq’s Constitution, all oil revenues, regardless 
the location of reserves, must go into central government budget which then gives KRG a share 
of the profit (nearly 17 %) and pays the international companies working on KRG territory. 
KRG’s attempts to manage independently the oil resources located on its territory have been 
source of many disputes with Iraqi central government.  
Its strained relations with the central government in Bagdad are not Ankara’s main 
concern now, as the recent developments involving the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIS 
or ISIL)49 represent a serious threat to Turkey’s security. Ankara is “wary of the potential for 
attacks by ISIL - attacks that would exploit the long border that runs from the Mediterranean to 
Iran”50,  but it is also concerned about the clashes with group’s militants on its border with Syria 
and the further seizing of oil fields in the Kurdish controlled territory51. But Turkey’s main 
concern is that the lack of authority of Iraq’s central government52 will prop up ISIS further 
                                                          
47 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, “Analysis”, April 17, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/co 
untries/analysisbriefs/Turkey/turkey.pdf (consulted on August 4, 2014). 
48 DALY John, “Turkey Finds High Grade Oil on Its Border with Iraq”, OilPrice.com, 20 January, 2014, 
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Turkey-Finds-High-Grade-Oil-on-its-Border-with-Iraq.html (consulted on 
August 3, 2014). 
49 A group of Sunni militants, ISIS/ISIL was formed in April 2013 from a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq which rapidly 
streamed in Syria. In January 2014, it took control of Iraqi town Fallujah, thereafter of several towns near the 
Iraq’s borders with Syria and Turkey; in June 2014, the group took control of Mosul and in August 2014 it defeated 
the Kurdish fighters, capturing Iraq’s biggest dam and an oil field. According to the reports, the group is now in 
control of nearly 35 % of Syria’s territory, including a large part of the oil and gas fields. On 29 June 2014, 
ISIL/ISIS declared the creation of a new religious state in Iraq and Syria, an Islamic “caliphate” and re-named 
itself “The Islamic State”. 
50 STRATFOR, “Worsening Violence in Iraq Threatens Regional Security”, Stratfor Analysis, June 11, 2014, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/worsening-violence-iraq-threatens-regional-security#axzz39SnNRkf3 
(consulted on August 5, 2014). 
51 Ibid. 
52 In this context, it is worth mentioning that on 11 June 2014 ISIS militants seized Turkey’s general consulate in 
Mosul and kidnapped 49 Turkish citizens-diplomats and their families, including three children. Ankara accused 
Iraq’s central government of failing to protect the Mosul consulate. On 6 August 2014, the diplomats were still 
captive. On 10 June 2014, 32 Turkish truck drivers were took hostage by ISIS, but they were released at the start 
of July.  
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strengthening and expanding which ultimately may lead to a dramatic change in the region’s 
balance of power. 
Though not an urging challenge as those ones one represented by Iraq’s and Syria’s, 
Cyprus is another important foreign policy’s issue on the future president’s foreign policy 
agenda. The visit made by the US vice president Joe Biden in Cyprus in May 2014 - the most 
senior US official to visit the divided island in more than 50 years - showed a clear sign of US 
administration to involve in the conflict’s resolution. As result of this visit, the Greek and 
Turkish Presidents agreed to meet at least twice a month in order to beef up the peace talks. 
Turkey can play an important role in the settlement process and, most importantly, it has a 
window of opportunity to benefit from the energy cooperation with Cyprus and furthermore 
with Israel, as significant oil and gas reserves have been discovered in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  Turkey can obtain strategic and economic advantages through cooperation with 
Cyprus on energy projects, as in order to diversify its external energy supplies, EU is committed 
to support the creation and development of a Mediterranean gas hub53 which will reinforce 
Turkey’s important role in the natural gas transit towards the European market. Moreover, 
Turkey’s further attempts to play a constructive role in the conflict’s settlement will be 
beneficial for country’s relations with both EU and US.  
Other major challenge for Turkey’s foreign policy and for the next president’s agenda 
will be Turkey’s relation with EU, particularly Turkey’s process of European integration. The 
European Commission expressed its “concern and disappointment” over the abovementioned 
government’s actions targeting the independence of judiciary, the civil liberties and freedom of 
expression and over the dismissal and re-assignment of police officers. All these measures will 
not definitely be reported as positive advancements in the annual Progress Report on EU 
negotiations which will be released this autumn by the European Commission.   
Most likely, at least on the short term, no radical change will occur with regard to the 
process of negotiations of EU integration54. But on the medium term and especially if the 
president’s powers and role will increase due to the shift to (semi-) presidential regime,  the 
                                                          
53 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council. European Energy Security Strategy, COM (2014), 330 final, May 5, 2014, Brussels. 
54 Currently, the integration negotiations with the EU are stalled: only one chapter was closed  and eight chapters 
are frozen as a result of EU Council Decision of 2006 due to Turkey’s refusal to apply the 2005 Additional Protocol 
to the Ankara Agreement of 1963, concerning Turkish recognition of Cyprus; France and Cyprus also frozen five, 
respectively six chapters of negotiations. In 2012, The Positive Agenda between EU and Turkey was set up in 
order to give a new impetus to the integration negotiations. In November 2013, Chapter 22 (Regional policy and 
coordination of structural instruments) was opened. In December 2013, EU and Turkey signed the Readmission 
Agreement and they launched the Visa Liberalization Dialogue. In order to successfully complete its accession to 
EU, Turkey needs to close 33 out of the 35 chapters of EU’s acquis communauitaire. 
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future president will have to address the current integration negotiations’ deadlock more 
seriously and attempt to adopt a decision related to Turkey-EU relations. He must opt out 
between the following options: maintaining the current stalemate, undertaking the necessary 
steps to unlock the negotiation process (including the recognition of Cyprus, inter alia) and, 
ultimately, devising and figuring out, in partnership with the European Commission, a mutually 
beneficial form of cooperation between Turkey and EU55. Based on pragmatic collaboration in 
a wide range of policy areas, this kind of cooperation, though not specifically seeking the status 
of EU membership for Ankara, can maintain a significant share of Turkey’s Europeanization 
path and let an open door to the integration process. Many factors - both domestic and 
external - will shape up this option and it is yet premature to foresee the future of Turkey-EU 
relations. 
In the past years, also the relations between Turkey and the Unites States have been 
overshadowed. The contentious issues between the two countries range from Turkey’s attitude 
towards Iran sanctions to differences over Egypt and Syria; from Ankara’s oil contracts with 
KRG to the Turkish authorities intention to sign a $3.44 billion missile defense contract with a 
Chinese company and the Gaza crisis; from the freedom of press to the graft scandal and more. 
However, in the current Middle East’s wide political unrest, Turkey and the United States must 
overcome their dissentions and frictions as they need each other’s cooperation to contain the 
chaos and restore the political stability of the region.  
Turkey’s foreign policy needs a re-start, which does include a new approach and a re-
thinking of both Turkey’s role in its neighbourhood and Turkey’s relations with its main 
Western partners, EU and US. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu did not present an articulated and 
comprehensive vision on foreign policy so far, but he called for giving up oversimplification, a 
change in the rhetoric of foreign policy, silent diplomacy and for refraining from “taking sides 
in internal fights between Arab countries and Arab sovereign families”56. Regarding Erdogan, 
up to now he has been showing no sign of flinching from his foreign policy approach and no 
withdrawal of his harsh public rhetoric towards EU and US. Moreover, he stated that Turkey 
will “continue to take the side of victims in Palestine, Libya, Iraq and Syria”57.  
                                                          
55 BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, “Back to Zero Problems? Recent Developments in Turkey’s Foreign 
Policy”, National Security Program/Foreign Policy Project, April 2014, pp. 1-18. 
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In conclusion, the domestic and foreign policy challenges which are lining up on 
Turkey’s future president agenda are numerous, difficult, complicated, and in some aspects 
facing conflicting outcomes. Adressing them will require not only exceptional political vision 
and acumen, but intelligent alliances and valuable partnerships, too. 
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